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Abstract
There are good motivations for considering some type of quantum histories formalism.
Several possible formalisms are known, defined by different definitions of event and by dif-
ferent selection criteria for sets of histories. These formalisms have a natural interpretation,
according to which nature somehow chooses one set of histories from among those allowed,
and then randomly chooses to realise one history from that set; other interpretations are
possible, but their scientific implications are essentially the same.
The selection criteria proposed to date are reasonably natural, and certainly raise
new questions. For example, the validity of ordering inferences which we normally take for
granted — such as that a particle in one region is necessarily in a larger region containing
it — depends on whether or not our history respects the criterion of ordered consistency,
or merely consistency.
However, the known selection criteria, including consistency and medium decoherence,
are very weak. It is not possible to derive the predictions of classical mechanics or Copen-
hagen quantum mechanics from the theories they define, even given observational data in
an extended time interval. Attempts to refine the consistent histories approach so as to
solve this problem by finding a definition of quasiclassicality have so far not succeeded.
On the other hand, it is shown that dynamical collapse models, of the type originally
proposed by Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber, can be re-interpreted as set selection criteria within
a quantum histories framework, in which context they appear as candidate solutions to
the set selection problem. This suggests a new route to relativistic generalisation of these
models, since covariant definitions of a quantum event are known.
Contribution to Proceedings of the 104th Nobel Symposium, “Modern Studies of Basic
Quantum Concepts and Phenomena”, Gimo, June 1997; to appear in Physica Scripta
(1998).
1. Introduction
The orthodox view of quantum theory has come under attack from several quarters
lately, rather to the mystification of those who think the existing theory perfectly adequate.
In particular, many can see no scientific motivation for a “consistent histories” interpre-
tation of quantum theory[1,2,3,4,5] which apparently cannot be experimentally refuted
without also refuting Copenhagen quantum theory. And, while the dynamical collapse
models proposed by Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber[6] and others[e.g. 7,8,9] at least offer testable
alternatives to quantum theory, their broader scientific motivations are also not widely
understood.
I will try here to motivate a histories approach to quantum theory, to describe the
problems (which are serious) with the existing consistent histories proposals, and to give a
unifying picture in which dynamical collapse models can be re-interpreted within a history
framework and seen as attempts to address the problems afflicting the existing proposals.
This is not meant as a survey, but rather a personal view of some of the key ideas in
the field; very different views of the consistent histories approach can be found among the
papers cited. I am particularly indebted to a collaboration with Dowker,[10,11] from which
some of the key points made below derive.
The existing consistent histories formulations of quantum theory have so far proved to
be of little or no direct scientific use per se. But it seems to me that some of the motivations
advanced by consistent historians are nonetheless valid and some of the questions they raise
are scientifically interesting. The approach, I will argue, should be seen as an incomplete
but interesting research program — a program that has run into serious problems, and
whose basic assumptions now need to be reconsidered, but one that includes some natural
ideas which are worth pursuing. Its ultimate aim, I will argue, must be to solve the so-called
set selection problem: that is, to define a histories formulation of quantum theory from
which successful existing theories — in particular, classical mechanics and the Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum theory — can be derived, within their domains of validity.
It is hard to see how to produce a quantum histories formulation that is both simple
and in precise agreement with standard quantum theory. But the derivation of existing
theories requires only agreement with known experiment, not necessarily precise agreement
with standard quantum theory. It will be shown that dynamical collapse models belong
to the class of generalised quantum histories theories. Viewed in this way, they illustrate
how the set selection problem can be satisfactorily solved in the non-relativistic limit.
This suggests another reason for taking collapse models seriously: in the non-
relativistic case, they are the best solutions known to the problem of defining a quan-
tum histories theory that satisfies fairly minimal scientific criteria. It seems to me also
to suggest that it is more natural, and more likely to be fruitful, to look for relativistic
generalisations of collapse models in the framework of history models than to try to find
some form of relativistic generalisation of the stochastic differential equations that define
the existing models.
2. The case for quantum histories
It can be hard to look afresh at so worked-over a topic as the scientific status of
quantum theory. Maybe it is helpful to recall an earlier scientific debate — that over the
behavourist program in experimental psychology.
Like many of the founders and developers of quantum theory, radical behaviourists
— most notably, Skinner — took a rigorously instrumentalist view. They saw the proper
task of psychology as the generation of theories predicting responses to stimuli, without in-
voking intermediate explanatory hypotheses about the mental states of the subject tested.
Such hypotheses were, in their view, scientifically meaningless, referring as they do to un-
measurable quantities. The common language of mental states was to be understood, at
best, as a sort of improper shorthand for statements about earlier stimuli. “The subject
is angry”, for example, might perhaps more accurately be translated as “the subject has
been repeatedly prodded with a stick”. The mind, in other words, was a black box — to
be prepared for experiment by stimuli, to be investigated through its responses to further
stimuli, and to be described theoretically by the correlations between the responses and
stimuli.
Skinnerian behaviourism was never an unquestioned orthodoxy, and has now been
almost completely abandoned. It was not rejected because of internal inconsistency, or
because psychologists rejected instrumentalism on purely philosophical grounds. It simply
became increasingly apparent that its axioms were obstructing good science. Mind-states
are, if nothing else, useful theoretical constructs, not always, in practice, fully explicable
in terms of prior stimuli. (Think of depression, for example.) And learning turns out to be
a subtler process than Skinnerian accounts allow. As Chomsky showed, the acquisition of
language cannot be explained purely as a product of classical stimulus-response condition-
ing: no scientific explanation of the fact that we speak grammatically can proceed from
Skinnerian axioms alone.
The Copenhagen view of a quantum system very much resembles the Skinnerian view
of the mind: statements about the system’s behaviour between preparation and measure-
ment are illegitimate. Consistent historians, like many other critics of quantum orthodoxy,
reject this, taking seriously the idea that quantum events take place, whether or not anyone
is looking. If we assume that the events somehow change the dynamics, clearly we have
something to test. But let us suppose for the moment, as consistent historians do, that
unobserved quantum events take place, but that the dynamics are unaltered. Could this
sort of interpretation still lead to interesting new science?
Probably the best case that it could comes from cosmology. When cosmological ideas
are discussed, we generally proceed from a quantum description of the initial or very early
conditions, and then explain its consequences in terms of successive events and processes
which, it is to be hoped, together explain the present state of the cosmos. Almost everyone
thinks this way; almost everyone realises it is illegitimate. (Successive events? During the
evolution of the closed quantum system that defines the universe? In the pre-classical era?)
What can we really mean?
One possible tactic is to try to interpret all hypotheses about past events in terms of
present observations. But will this always be possible? We cannot hope to calculate the
probabilities of present states directly from the initial conditions in a realistic theory: any
successful cosmological theory is bound to involve a long chain of reasoning involving many
successive events. Practically speaking, will the present consequences of every intermediate
hypothesis be calculable? And in principle, is it clear that good theories will involve only
quantum events which have directly and independently observable present consequences?
Any more, say, than it is clear that mind-states can be reduced to stimuli, in practice or
in principle?
Different people have different intuitions on these questions at present. Time will tell:
for what it is worth, I follow Hartle[12] in believing that the reduction will probably be
impossible. Clearly, if future cosmological theories turn out to be irreducible to present
observations, and if no more radical modification of quantum theory takes place, some sort
of quantum histories formalism will be needed. We will need to be able to make sense of
the notion that some sequence of events, drawn from some larger set of possibilities, took
place during the evolution of a closed system. How then might the possible events and
histories be defined?
3. Events and histories
A quantum event ought, presumably, to have a mathematical representation that
fits naturally into a standard formulation of quantum theory, in a way that allows us to
consider histories: collections of events occurring during the evolution of a system. We
need, too, a natural rule for defining sample spaces of possible histories, with a probability
measure. And it must be possible, at least in principle, to represent at least some familiar
physical events — the results of measurements, for example — in terms of the defined
histories, in order to connect the definitions with physics as we know it.
Several different definitions satisfying these demands have been proposed. The sim-
plest version of quantum event is defined by fixing a time, t, at which it takes place, together
with a Heisenberg picture projection P , which — so to speak — says what happened: the
system was in the range of P at time t.
A complete list of exclusive alternative events at time tj is then given by a projective
decomposition of the identity:
σj = {P (1)j , . . . , P (nj)j } ;
nj∑
i=1
P
(i)
j = I ; P
(i)
j P
(i′)
j = δ
ii′P
(i′)
j . (1)
An elementary history H is a list of projections {P (i1)1 , . . . , P (in)n } at distinct times t1
to tn, and a complete set of exclusive alternative histories is defined by all the possible
combinations of projections from any fixed set of projective decompositions at distinct
times
S = {σ1, t1; . . . ; σn, tn} . (2)
The set S defines a sample space, and a probability distribution is defined by defining the
probability of an elementary history:
P (H) = Tr(P (in)n . . . P
(i1)
1 ρP
(i1)
1 . . . P
(in)
n ) , (3)
where ρ is the initial density matrix of the system at t = 0. Note that these quantities
satisfy the probability axioms — i.e. they are non-negative and add to one — without any
further restriction on the set S.
This definition can usefully be generalised to “unsharp” events represented by positive
operators, an idea first investigated by Rudolph.[13,14] For the discussion here the following
simple definitions (not equivalent to Rudolph’s) will be adequate. An unsharp event, again
at fixed time t, is defined by any positive operatorA
unsharp events at time tj is given by a decomposition of the identity into distinct positive
operators:
σj = {A(1)j , . . . , A(nj)j } ;
nj∑
i=1
A
(i)
j = I ; A
(i)
j 6= A(i
′)
j for i 6= i′ . (4)
Elementary histories and complete sets of exclusive alternative histories are defined
by generalising the projection operator definitions in the obvious way, and the probability
of an elementary history H = {Ai11 , . . . , Ainn } is given by
P (H) = Tr((A(in)n )
1
2 . . . (A
(i1)
1 )
1
2 ρ(A
(i1)
1 )
1
2 . . . (A(in)n )
1
2 ) . (5)
Again, these quantities automatically behave as probabilities.
Alternatively, events can be defined by partitions of the configuration space path
integral.[15,12] Temporarily moving to the Schro¨dinger picture and taking the initial state
|ψ〉 to be pure, we can use a partition of the space of paths {cα}α∈A to define branches
|ψα〉 and class operators Cα by
|ψα〉 ≡ Cα|ψ〉 =
∫
cα
δq exp
(
iS[q(τ)]/h¯
)|ψ〉 . (6)
Summing over all paths gives the usual evolution, so that
∑
α
Cα = e
−iHT/h¯ . (7)
The probability weights
P (cα) =
ww∣∣ψα〉ww2 (8)
can — provided
∑
α p(cα) is finite — be normalised to probabilities for the elementary
events cα.
From the fundamental point of view, this is perhaps the most interesting approach.
Not only does it allow events to be defined covariantly in a background spacetime —
the classes cα could correspond to paths crossing or not crossing various space-time re-
gions, for example — but it can also be extended, at least formally, to sum-over-manifold
formulations of quantum gravity.
It is worth mentioning for completeness (though they will not be needed here) that
natural generalisations of projection-valued events corresponding to multi-time proposi-
tions can also be defined — a simple example being that the composite event defined
by the conjunction of two elementary events can be represented by the tensor product
of the relevant projection operators. One of the aims of the Isham-Linden-Schreckenberg
version[16,17,18] of consistent histories is to investigate general definitions of multi-time
events and their physical relevance.
Logically, all of these definitions make perfect sense. Scientifically, they have two se-
rious problems. First, whichever definition is used, probability distributions are defined
on uncountably many different sets of histories, and it is not clear which of these sets (if
indeed any) are appropriate in any given physical situation. Second, though the distribu-
tions obviously satisfy the mathematical axioms for probabilities, it is not at all clear that
they are physically meaningful.
4. “Consistency” and other selection criteria
The consistent histories approach attempts to address the last-mentioned problem, by
restricting to sets of histories on which the probability distributions have properties which
are, at least arguably, desirable. It is not absolutely clear, though, that these properties
are always necessary for physical relevance. And it is clear that they are not sufficient: the
approach does not address the first problem, as we will see.
So it should perhaps be stressed at the outset that none of the selection criteria
discussed here has any privileged status. There is no logical or mathematical requirement
to impose any criterion — the technical term “consistency” is here rather misleading. The
various criteria proposed to date are simply guesses. Even if the basic idea of a quantum
histories approach is correct, so that for any given physical system there is some identifiable
set of histories which probabilistically predicts the past and future events from initial data,
it is possible that this set satisfies none of these criteria.
That said, one has to start somewhere, and the various criteria do characterise inter-
esting properties. So far as is known, not (quite) every criterion considered can be naturally
extended to cover every notion of a history, but the projection operator notion of events
illustrates the full spectrum of possibilities. It is simplest again to consider non-relativistic
quantum theory, in the Heisenberg picture.
Griffiths’ original consistency criterion for a set S of histories is that the probability
formula ought to respect the rule that the union of events can be represented by summing
the corresponding projection operators, so that
Tr(Qn . . .Q1ρQ1 . . .Qn) =
∑
i1∈I1...in∈In
Tr(P (in)n . . . P
(i1)
1 ρP
(i1)
1 . . . P
(in)
n ) , (9)
for all projections
Qj =
∑
ij∈Ij
P
(ij)
j (10)
given by sums of the elementary projections at time tj in S. This holds[1] if and only if
Re (Tr(P (in)n . . . P
(ir)
r . . . P
(i1)
1 ρP
(i1)
1 . . . P
(i′r)
r . . . P
(in)
n )) = δiri′rp(i1 . . . in) , (11)
for all r and all choices of i1, . . . , in and i
′
r, where p(i1, . . . , in) is shorthand for the history
probability (3) .
A consistent set of histories defined by positive operator events can also naturally be
defined by extending equation (9) , so that we say a set S = {σ1, t1; . . . ; σn, tn} defined by
positive operator decompositions of the form (4) is consistent if
Tr(Bn . . .B1ρB1 . . .Bn) =
∑
i1∈I1...in∈In
Tr(B(in)n . . .B
(i1)
1 ρB
(i1)
1 . . .B
(in)
n ) , (12)
where
B
(i)
j = (A
(i)
j )
1
2 ; Bj = (
∑
i∈Ij
A
(i)
j )
1
2 . (13)
The main point of these definitions is that the probability for an individual event in
a history belonging to a consistent set can be calculated very simply even when one is
partially or completely ignorant of past events. For example, equation (9) implies that, if
nothing is known about the past, the probability of P inn would simply be
Tr(P (in)n ρP
(in)
n ) ; (14)
equation (12) implies the analogous statement in the case of positive operator events.
The stronger condition of medium decoherence[5] requires that
Tr(P (in)n . . . P
(i1)
1 ρP
(j1)
1 . . . P
(jn)
n ) = δi1j1 . . . δinjnp(i1 . . . in) . (15)
Again, the terminology can mislead the unwary: medium decoherence is mathematically
a natural condition, but it does not generally identify sets of histories describing events
characterised by decoherence in the ordinary physical sense. Gell-Mann and Hartle have
also investigated[19] a criterion of strong decoherence. This proposal, however, must be
considered exploratory: as it stands, every medium decoherent set is strongly decoherent.
These early attempts at selection criteria are very weak, in a sense to be made more
precise in the next sections. One reflection of that weakness is the disconcerting fact
that it is easy to find examples in which they allow two or more contrary propositions —
statements corresponding to orthogonal projections — to be retrodicted from the same
data, each with probability one, in different sets.[20,21] For example, one can arrange so
that different sets imply that, at a given time, a given particle was in one of two different
(non-intersecting) boxes. A consequence of this is that logical implications which we nor-
mally take for granted are violated. For example, according to a consistent or decoherent
histories analysis, it can lead to a logical contradiction to infer from the observation that
a particle was in a given region at a given time that the particle was in a larger region
containing the first.
A somewhat stronger criterion, which eliminates this problem, can be defined as
follows.[21] The standard partial ordering on projections, according to which P ≤ Q if
and only if PQ = QP = P , defines a natural partial ordering on the class of histories:
{P1, t1;P2, t2; . . . ;Pn, tn} ≤ {Q1, t1;Q2, t2; . . . ;Qn, tn} ⇔ Pi ≤ Qi for all i . (16)
Histories differing only by the inclusion of copies of the identity operator at various times
are here regarded as equivalent. We now define an ordered consistent history to be a
history H, belonging to some medium decoherent set S, with the property that if H ′ is a
history belonging to any other medium decoherent set S′ such that H ≤ H ′ then we have
P (H) ≤ P (H ′), and similarly H ≥ H ′ implies P (H) ≥ P (H ′). An ordered consistent set
is then a set all of whose elementary histories are ordered consistent. Ordered consistency
can be defined similarly for the positive operator and path integral partition definitions of
a quantum event.
There is some room for doubt as to whether ordered consistency is too strong a cri-
terion: it has not been convincingly demonstrated that all familiar physics can necessarily
be described by ordered consistent sets of histories. It would be particularly good to re-
solve this question, since either answer leads to an interesting conclusion. If arguments
can be found that ordered consistent sets are adequate, then ordered consistency defines
the strongest and least problematic quantum histories approach currently available that
respects standard quantum dynamics. Conversely, if ordered consistent sets can be shown
to be inadequate, then standard ordering implications would have to be abandoned, with
radical implications for our scientific worldview: it would no longer be possible to infer
that a measurement of any observable in any range implies that it lay in any strictly larger
range, for example.[21]
Two other criteria — linear positivity[22] and feasibility[23] — have also recently been
defined. Both are weaker than consistency: for them to be of independent use in solving
the problems considered here, some plausibly physically relevant refinement incompatible
with consistency would have to be found.
To summarise, we have a spectrum of reasonably natural criteria which, as it happens,
can be ordered in terms of increasing refinement: feasibility, linear positivity, consistency,
medium decoherence, ordered consistency. There are thus at least six candidate quantum
histories schemes, based on unrestricted sets of histories or on sets selected by one of the
five criteria, and most of these schemes can be defined for each of the three natural notions
of quantum event discussed to date.
Fortunately, these schemes all share some key features, which means that in assessing
their present scientific status they need not all be discussed separately. Unfortunately, as
we will see, this is largely because all the known criteria are far too weak.
5. Interpreting history-based schemes
Broadly speaking, there are two views of what the consistent histories formalism,
or any other new version of quantum theory, could be good for. According to one, the
idea is to understand what quantum theory really means, in some abstract idealistic sense.
According to the other, the ultimate aim is to make scientific progress in the more concrete
sense of generating new testable theories, allowing new calculations, and making new
predictions, while retaining the successes of the Copenhagen interpretation — in short to
go beyond Copenhagen quantum theory in something like the way that general relativity
goes beyond Newtonian gravity. Part of the reason why the subject is so controversial, I
suspect, is that it is sometimes the battleground for a kind of undeclared guerilla conflict
between these motives, which perhaps are not always cleanly disentangled even in authors’
own minds.
I would place recent attempts by Griffiths,[2] Omne`s[24,4] — note, incidentally, that
Omne`s’ theory of “truth”[24] is almost entirely wrong,[10] as Omne`s now accepts — and
Isham[25] to set out logical structures for the consistent histories formalism in the first
camp. It seems to me these ideas can only be appraised on their own terms: at the
moment they promise no new concrete scientific yield.
In practical terms, however, all the interpretational ideas which have been set out
for the consistent histories approach have the same scientific implications, with one minor
caveat that I will address in a moment. The following discussion applies equally to all the
other quantum histories approaches.
Everyone agrees that the generally incompatible pictures of physics given by the un-
countably many different consistent sets have to be assigned equal fundamental status.
The formalism does not distinguish amongst them: to do that would need further selec-
tion criteria, which would define a different quantum histories approach. However, the
physics we actually see is described by just one history.
There are three slightly different ways of interpreting the situation. The most eco-
nomical is (i) that nature has chosen, somehow, one consistent set — since it is not known
if there is any natural measure on the full class of consistent sets, we cannot be more
precise — which defines the sample space of histories and their probabilities. Nature then
randomly chooses, according to these probabilities, to realise one history, which must turn
out to be the one we see.
One could say, alternatively, (ii) that one history is randomly chosen from every
consistent set, or (iii) that all the histories from every consistent set are realised in numbers
proportional to their probabilities. In either case, we must somehow find ourselves attached
to precisely one of the realised histories. A possible attraction of these last two ways of
putting things, one might think, is that they allow the possibility that the type of history we
find ourselves in is not determined randomly, nor by new fundamental selection criteria, but
by something to do with us — specifically, that our consciousness somehow attaches itself
to quasiclassical histories. Some such hypothesis, within the second picture, seems indeed
to underlie some of Gell-Mann and Hartle’s and Griffiths’ arguments,[5,26,10] though for
obvious reasons it has not been fleshed out. However, even if these ideas could be made
concrete, there is a compelling argument to show that they would not work, essentially
because any given quasiclassical history belongs to many inequivalent consistent sets. This
makes it impossible, in the second picture, to derive the predictions of classical mechanics
or Copenhagen quantum mechanics, even under the assumption that we will persistently
experience quasiclassicality.[27] (The third picture, I believe, suffers from a similar problem,
though no discussion has appeared in print.)
Given this failing, and since the pictures are equivalent unless some unknown theory
of consciousness is attached, we need only consider the first picture. Nature, it says,
is described by one of a large number of sub-theories, which correspond to the various
sets of histories — in rather the same sort of way, for example, as general relativity says
that nature is described by one of the solutions of Einstein’s equations. The sub-theories
in the consistent histories formalism (and the other quantum histories formalisms) are
probabilistic rather than deterministic, of course, since choosing the set only determines the
space of possible histories. But that itself is no drawback (except to diehard determinists).
The key question is what we can achieve with this collection of sub-theories. How far can
the analogy be pressed?
6. Why the known criteria are too weak
General relativity is almost universally seen as the paradigm of a successful physical
theory, incorporating and unifying as it does special relativity, Newtonian gravity, and
classical mechanics. Of course, its incompatibility with quantum theory and its singular-
ities suggest that it will eventually be supplanted. But setting aside these problems, the
theory has what might be, but usually is not, seen as an intrinsic weakness: it does not
tell us which solution of Einstein’s equations nature has chosen. This is not seen as a
significant weakness since Einstein’s equations can be solved locally given initial data on
a hypersurface, which in turn can be approximated by carrying out measurements in a
local region. We thus can and do carry out observations to determine which local solu-
tion is relevant, and hence make predictions and retrodictions within general relativity. In
particular, in this way, we can derive the predictions of Newtonian gravity and classical
mechanics within their domain of validity, which we understand to be the weak field limit
of general relativity. In short, we understand when and why Newtonian gravity and classi-
cal mechanics hold true, and how to tell whether they will hold true in any given physical
situation.
An analogously successful quantum histories approach would incorporate classical
mechanics and Copenhagen quantum mechanics in a similar way. It need not provide a
theory of the quantum boundary conditions — we can assume for the sake of the argument
that these are fixed. Nor need it supply a priori the set from which nature chooses the
realised history. But, applied to non-relativistic quantum mechanics, it should explain how
to identify that set post hoc, on the basis of observations within some finite time interval.
(In the relativistic case, it should presumably explain how to extrapolate a local description
of the set, given observations in some finite space-time region.) And it must characterise
the domain of validity of classical mechanics and Copenhagen quantum theory and explain
what types of observations are necessary in order to infer predictions and retrodictions
within those theories.
No quantum histories approach defined by any of the existing criteria satisfies any of
these demands — quite the reverse. For example, in any physically reasonable model, it is
impossible to identify the correct medium decoherent set, or infer any of the decompositions
defining its past or future events, on the basis of any set of observations taking place in
any finite time interval.[10,11] If we know the initial density matrix ρ and the hamiltonian,
and we observe that the series of events defined by projections P1, . . . , Pn took place at
times t1 < . . . < tn, we still generally cannot identify any of the projective decompositions
which define the set, from which this partial history is drawn, at times before t1 or after
tn: there are almost always many incompatible medium decoherent sets which incorporate
the observed data and make incompatible retrodictions of the past and predictions of the
future.
In short, almost nothing can be unambiguously predicted or retrodicted on the basis
of the medium decoherent histories formalism alone. We can make statements of the form
“if the relevant medium decoherent set is S, then the following future (or past) events are
possible (or may have occurred), with the following probabilities”. But we cannot identify
S, and without doing so we cannot derive classical mechanics or Copenhagen quantum
mechanics, or fully explain their successes. This is the main reason why, it seems to me, the
existing quantum histories formalisms can only be viewed as part of a seriously incomplete
research program. What seems to be required, if it is to be completed, is a criterion
sufficiently strong that data in a finite time interval can either positively identify the
relevant set of quantum histories or at least constrain the range of possibilities sufficiently
that standard physics can be derived. This is the so-called set selection problem.[10] A
set selection criterion need not, of course, necessarily be deterministic: a suitably chosen
probability measure on the space of sets might do the job.
To solve the set selection problem would (almost certainly) need some mathematical
characterisation of quasiclassicality — the combination of sporadic quantum unpredictabil-
ity and generally deterministic classical evolution, following simple of equations of motion,
that characterises our physical world. Attempts have been made to find such a character-
isation by refining the consistent histories formalism.[28,19,29] The problems encountered
seem formidable, and it is hard to believe a general solution will be found in the foreseeable
future. Perhaps there is none.
It is sometimes necessary to step back in order to make progress. It seems at least
worth considering the possibility that the criterion of consistency is too restrictive, and
that the set selection problem should be addressed within the broader quantum histories
framework. In fact, as the next section explains, in the non-relativistic case at least,
much more progress can be made this way: dynamical collapse models can be naturally
reinterpreted as candidate solutions to the set selection problem.
7. Unification of quantum history and dynamical reduction approaches
Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber’s “spontaneous localisation” or “quantum jump” model,[6] lu-
cidly explained in simple terms by Bell,[30] is the ur-model of modern dynamical collapse
theories. In an appropriate limit, it leads to one of a class of Markovian stochastic dif-
ferential equations,[7] which define testable alternatives to the Schro¨dinger equation. Sev-
eral concrete proposals of this type[e.g. 7,8,9,31] have been put forward, as well as more
speculative ideas concerning possible relativistic generalisations.[e.g. 32,33] While this has
undoubtedly been a very fruitful direction to pursue, it is surely not the only interesting
way of extending the original GRW model. I would like to suggest another path here.
Recall that, according to the original GRW model, defined for N distinguishable
spinless particles, the wave function
ψ(x1, . . . , xN ; t) (17)
undergoes two types of evolution. Almost all of the time, it follows the Schro¨dinger equa-
tion, but at discrete randomly chosen times it jumps discontinuously, so that
ψ → C exp(−(xi − x)2/2a2)ψ , (18)
where particle i is chosen randomly from 1 to N , the coordinate x is chosen randomly from
the distribution ∫
d3x1 . . . d
3xN exp(−(xi − x)2/a2)|ψ|2 , (19)
a is a constant parametrising the model, and C is chosen so that the new wave function is
normalised. The times of these jumps are defined by a Poisson process, with mean interval
τ/N between jumps. The parameters τ and a are to be thought of here as new constants
of nature; GRW originally suggested
a ≈ 10−5 cm, τ ≈ 1015 sec. (20)
Of course, this is rather ad hoc, and no one seriously believes that these equations —
or any of the models proposed to date — are likely to be precisely correct. But the GRW
model and its successors demonstrate that mathematically precise theories can be found
from which both the Schro¨dinger equation and the projection postulate can be derived as
approximations,[6,30] in a way which extends to indistinguishable particles,[7] and with
parameters that can be chosen consistent with experiment, so far as is known.[34]
To rephrase the model in the language of histories, note that the jump equation (18)
corresponds to an unsharp event defined by a positive operator Aix whose action on wave
functions φ is
Aix : φ→ exp(−(xi − x)2/a2)φ , (21)
so that up to normalisation (18) can be written as
ψ → (Aix)
1
2ψ . (22)
The operators Aix define a continuous decomposition of the identity:
1
N
√
api
∑
i
∫
d3xAix = I . (23)
The probability distribution (19) can equivalently be written as
〈ψ|Aix|ψ〉 = Tr((Aix)
1
2 |ψ〉〈ψ|(Aix)
1
2 ) . (24)
(This is no accident: GRW’s definitions were motivated by the theory of unsharp measure-
ments.)
Now, if the initial state ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ|, then the probability (5) for the quantum history
defined by a series of unsharp events chosen from decompositions (23) is
Tr((Ainxn)
1
2 . . . (Ai1x1)
1
2 ρ(Ai1x1)
1
2 . . . (Ainxn)
1
2 ) . (25)
Translating from the Heisenberg picture to the Schro¨dinger, we see that (18) and (19) are
precisely the outcomes and probabilities for unsharp events of this kind.
Rewritten in this way, the GRW model defines a probabilistic set selection rule for a
quantum histories formulation based on unsharp events. The set is selected by the choice
of decompositions (23) together with the random choice of Poisson times; its histories are
given by sequences of unsharp events Aix at the chosen times. Since continuous stochastic
equations of quite general form can be arbitrarily well approximated[7] by discrete jump
models of GRW type, the later dynamical collapse model proposals[7,8,9,31] can also effec-
tively be interpreted in the same way. The selected sets, however, violate (12) and so are
not consistent — which is why the models disagree with standard quantum theory. If one
is willing to pay this price (without necessarily contradicting experiment), quasiclassicality
is not so hard to characterise.
8. Conclusions and prospects
Things happened in the past, which were unobserved at the time, and whose conse-
quences it is now impractical to describe in terms of present observations; to understand
the present state of the world properly, we need to be able to include such past events in
our theories — these may not be unquestionable assumptions, but they do not seem par-
ticularly outlandish. They could turn out to be more or less forced on us by accumulating
cosmological data.
In any case, it seems worth trying to incorporate them into quantum theory. The least
radical way of doing so is to try to find a natural representation of past events in some
standard approach to quantum theory — perhaps as projections, positive operators, or
partitions of the path integral — and then to try to define some probabilistic interpretation
in which histories of events are the primary objects. This leads naturally to some form of
quantum histories approach, in which histories are grouped into complete sets of exclusive
alternatives, on each of which sets a probability measure is defined.
One can then, by trying to characterise interesting mathematical properties of sets
of histories, try to develop criteria which select out sets that might be particularly physi-
cally interesting. Any criterion defines a new quantum histories formalism; all of these
formalisms have a natural interpretation. This is the route pioneered by Griffiths,[1]
Omnes,[3] Gell-Mann and Hartle,[5] who have set out a consistent (or decoherent) histories
interpretation of quantum theory based on particular choices of criteria; stronger[21] and
weaker[22,23] natural criteria have also been found.
As a research program, the quantum histories approach has been, and presumably will
continue to be, very productive, raising many new and interesting questions. However,
considered as a finished product, the consistent (or decoherent) histories interpretation
must, I believe, be judged a failure as a scientific theory. Its relation to classical mechanics
and Copenhagen quantum mechanics is very different from, for example, that of general
relativity to Newtonian gravity and fluid dynamics. And the comparison is not to its
advantage: it is unable to account for the simplest predictions or retrodictions, or to
explain the success of Copenhagen quantum mechanics or classical mechanics.[10,11]
Even judged as mathematical criteria, consistency and medium decoherence, while
undoubtedly interesting properties of sets of histories, involve arbitrary choices and have
some decidedly unnatural features.[20] It may, in any event, be more sensible to treat the
existing criteria as useful taxonomic labels rather than as badges of validity. Perhaps some
inconsistent sets of histories will turn out to be scientifically useful; certainly almost all
consistent sets will not.
The key scientific problem in quantum histories approaches is to find some set selection
rule, probabilistic or deterministic, sufficiently strong that it allows classical mechanics,
Copenhagen quantum mechanics, and quantum field theory to be derived within charac-
terisable domains of validity. (Given a quantum theory of gravity, one would similarly
hope to be able to derive general relativity.)
It is an open question whether any precise rule of this type can be found within
the consistent histories approach, even in the non-relativistic case. The attempts to date
do not inspire overwhelming optimism. However, by going outside the consistent histo-
ries framework, and deviating from standard quantum mechanics, a solution to the non-
relativistic set selection problem can be found, by reinterpreting dynamical collapse models
of Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber type in the framework of quantum histories.
Encouragingly from the point of view of relativistic generalisation, the quantum histo-
ries framework includes covariantly defined notions of event.[12] In this sense each approach
seems to hold out the prospect of a solution to the deepest problem of the other. A covari-
antly defined set selection rule, which picks out generally inconsistent sets and reduces to
something resembling a dynamical collapse model in the non-relativistic limit, would be a
particularly attractive way of solving the deep problem of interpreting quantum theory in
the cosmological context, since it need not necessarily require any great conceptual revo-
lution that threatens the successes of our present theories or (most of) their fundamental
principles. It would, of course, disagree at least subtly with the predictions of standard
quantum theory — but then, if nature really has chosen to make fundamental use of the
notion of a quantum event, it would seem uncharacteristically tasteless to have done so in
a way that leaves such events entirely undetectable.
Though the line of thought which leads to this last speculative proposal could, of
course, be wrong in any of several places, it seems to me to strengthen the case for taking
dynamical collapse models seriously.
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